{"id":8437,"date":"2019-10-08T00:01:10","date_gmt":"2019-10-08T04:01:10","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.jasonapollovoss.local\/?p=8437"},"modified":"2020-06-05T23:48:44","modified_gmt":"2020-06-06T03:48:44","slug":"the-most-misunderstood-investing-concepts-risk-%e2%89%a0-volatility","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/2019\/10\/08\/the-most-misunderstood-investing-concepts-risk-%e2%89%a0-volatility\/","title":{"rendered":"The Most Misunderstood Investing Concepts: Risk \u2260 Volatility"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>If you have followed my writing for any length of time you surely know that I hate the concept of volatility in investing. It is used as a proxy for risk and honestly that is a disaster for our industry, and for our end clients. Though I have covered this ground previously, I do not think I have covered it in as detailed a fashion as I do below. First, though, here are the other editions of this series on The Most Misunderstood Investing Concepts:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web2019\/03\/20\/the-most-misunderstood-investing-concepts-fair-value\/\">Fair value and its evil twin, target price<\/a>;<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web2019\/04\/02\/the-most-misunderstood-investing-concepts-time-horizon\/\">Time horizon and its subterranean influence on investors\u2019 thinking<\/a>;<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web2019\/04\/16\/the-most-misunderstood-investing-concepts-peg-ratios\/\">PEG ratios and the ignorance of the math underlying them<\/a>; and,<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web2019\/09\/24\/the-most-misunderstood-investing-concepts-growth-is-not-free\/\">When valuing a business, growth is not free!<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>Risk = Volatility Only in Finance<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The concept of volatility as risk rests on a critical assumption that is overlooked by most of the industry: Only in finance is risk defined as\u00a0volatility. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.merriam-webster.com\/dictionary\/risk\">Dictionary definitions of risk<\/a>\u00a0have as their center of gravity, something like the \u201cchance of loss.\u201d For example:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Noun:\u00a0<em>exposure to the chance of injury or loss; a hazard or dangerous chance.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>Insurance:\u00a0<em>the degree of probability of such loss.<\/em><\/li>\n<li>Verb:\u00a0<em>to expose to the chance of injury or loss; hazard.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Surely you notice that not a single definition includes volatility as a part of the meaning of risk. You might say, \u201cYeah, that\u2019s great but dictionary definitions and popular understandings of risk might differ from a business definition.\u201d But a popular business dictionary from Barron\u2019s describes over a dozen\u00a0different forms of risk, ranging from\u00a0exchange rate risk\u00a0to\u00a0unsystematic risk, all of which focus on the chance of permanent loss. Where\u2019s volatility? Nowhere to be found.<\/p>\n<p>Risk is central to the concerns of investors, but not the way it is in the very business whose entire operations are obsessed with it, the insurance business. These are some of the oldest enterprises on the planet and they are worth hundreds of billions of dollars. They must have a hyper-refined understanding of risk in order to be a going concern, and for several centuries. Yet, an insurance licensing tutorial\u00a0says that \u201cRisk means the same thing in insurance that it does in everyday language. Risk is the chance or uncertainty of loss.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Only finance equates risk with volatility. Isn\u2019t this peculiar? Why? How?<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>I would love it if you would <a href=\"https:\/\/feedburner.google.com\/fb\/a\/mailverify?uri=JasonApolloVoss\"><strong>receive notification of my new articles \u2013 sign up here<\/strong><\/a> \ud83d\ude42 Don\u2019t forget to comment on the article in the space below. Thanks!<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>Risk = Volatility Origin Story<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In\u00a01952, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.math.ust.hk\/~maykwok\/courses\/ma362\/07F\/markowitz_JF.pdf\">Harry Markowitz argued that investment portfolios should optimize expected return relative to volatility<\/a>. In \u201cPortfolio Selection\u201d risk is directly associated with volatility and as measured by the variance of return. Markowitz states, \u201cV (variance) is the average squared deviation of Y from its expected value. V is a commonly used measure of dispersion.\u201d He then continues to say:<\/p>\n<p><em>We next consider the rule that the investor does (or should) consider expected return a desirable thing\u00a0and\u00a0variance of return an undesirable thing. . . We illustrate geometrically relations between beliefs and choice of portfolio according to the \u2018expected returns \u2014 variance of returns\u2019 rule.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Whoa, did you catch what just happened there? Investors\u00a0<em>do<\/em>\u00a0want variance of return, and to the upside. Right? Yet, Markowitz states, \u201cthe rule that the investor does consider\u2026variance of return an undesirable thing.\u201d Not only that, how did a blithe proposition regarding a statistical calculation when he was discussing \u201cV (variance)\u201d turn into a \u201crule\u201d in less than a paragraph? Markowitz then states, again a bit blithely, \u201c[This rule] assumes that there is a portfolio which gives both maximum expected return and minimum variance, and it commends this portfolio to the investor.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Sadly, this sentence is the source of tremendous misunderstanding: risk \u2260 volatility. Ugh!<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>We Live in a CAPM World<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>This philosophical screwup creates a major problem for how investment managers are currently evaluated. Markowitz is the basis for the belief asset allocation is the most important consideration when seeking the maximum return for a given amount of volatility. Because his work was seen not just as a philosophical treatise, but also as a tool, the investment industry still seeks efficient frontiers made up of \u201ca portfolio which gives maximum expected return and minimum variance.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>It is not minimum variance that investors want! It should go without saying they want maximum upside relative to downside, or in other words, large outperformance that offsets smaller underperformance. Sadly, though, mean-variance frontiers became the first pillar of modern portfolio theory (Capital Asset Pricing Model and Efficient Market Hypothesis being the other two). In fact, the positive correlation of risk and return is a paramount assumption in CAPM.<\/p>\n<p>In other words, this idea lies at the heart of two of three pillars of a modern portfolio theory. Thus, if it is demonstrated that the risk = volatility connection is spurious then we should also have confidence in rejecting MPT.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>There is No Evidence<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The powerful prediction that beta, as a measure of risk, has a positive relationship with expected returns was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/1818402?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents\">challenged by Irwin Friend and Marshall Blume just a few years after the CAPM was first proposed<\/a>. Based on a sample of 200 portfolios using monthly returns from 1960-1968, they conclude:<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><em>While rate of return is normally found to be positively related to risk, the adjustment of the rate of return for risk which would be expected to eliminate <strong>this relationship actually reverses it <\/strong><\/em>[emphasis mine]<em>.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Figure 1: Beta versus Expected Return from Friend and Bloom (1970)<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/webwp-content\/uploads\/2019\/10\/Beta-versus-Expected-Return-from-Friend-and-Bloom.png\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-8438\" src=\"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/webwp-content\/uploads\/2019\/10\/Beta-versus-Expected-Return-from-Friend-and-Bloom.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"498\" height=\"366\" srcset=\"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/10\/Beta-versus-Expected-Return-from-Friend-and-Bloom.png 2420w, https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/10\/Beta-versus-Expected-Return-from-Friend-and-Bloom-300x220.png 300w, https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/10\/Beta-versus-Expected-Return-from-Friend-and-Bloom-768x564.png 768w, https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/10\/Beta-versus-Expected-Return-from-Friend-and-Bloom-1024x752.png 1024w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 498px) 100vw, 498px\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>The original graph from Friend and Bloom showing beta versus performance (expected return) is displayed up above. In one of the great understatements in the history of financial research, they conclude \u201cThe results are striking\u201d! The graph clearly shows a negative slope rather than the positive one predicted by the CAPM. This means that the portfolio with supposedly the highest level of risk (i.e. highest beta) generated the lowest return. To this day, this is a gob smacking result. Wow!<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Furthermore, the intercept, which is supposed to be zero based on how the test variables are constructed, was positive, meaning the intercept of the security market line is greater than the risk-free rate intercept predicted by the model. [The regression variables are constructed by subtracting the risk-free rate from both sides, so if the CAPM is correct, the intercept should be equal to zero.] Their results not only are visually convincing but are also highly statistically significant.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Friend and Bloom set off a scramble among academics to explain why the empirical results did not match theoretical predictions. Dozens of explanations have been proposed and tested over the decades, but none have salvaged beta as the exclusive measure of risk in financial markets. Similar research condemns other measures of volatility standing in as \u201crisk.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>Frankenstein Lives On<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Despite, Friend and Bloom delivering an unmistakable \u201cdead on arrival\u201d message to the academic finance community, volatility = risk lives on like an over-electrified Frankenstein\u2019s monster. The theory goes that if you want more return, you must take on more risk. Not only that, but a pernicious corollary is that if you have more return, it necessarily <em>must be<\/em> because you took on more risk as an investment manager. The framework provided by Markowitz is still with us after almost 70 years. This return for risk trade-off is used to explain investment manager outcomes almost daily, despite its lack of support. &lt;sigh!&gt;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Our industry forgets that implicit in Markowitz\u2019s work is a framework for improving investment management. He attempted to improve active investment management returns, not to worsen them. Yea! Markowitz\u2019s overriding point is about the wisdom of \u201cdon\u2019t put all of your eggs in one basket,\u201d and how to manufacture the best basket for your eggs. In doing so, he is not primarily concerned with what constitutes the soundest measure of risk. Instead, he is applying statistical concepts to make an important point: proper diversification can lead to better outcomes in investing.<\/p>\n<p>Making the leap to volatility and its close cousin, beta, as risk measures, as much of the industry has done, is an egregious mistake. Sadly, this legacy is still with us. Most investment managers are still evaluated as to their skill based on their Sharpe ratio (and very rarely on their Treynor ratio). Both put volatility right at the heart of their calculations. Another legacy of this misunderstanding is that old alpha-destroyer \u201ctracking error.\u201d Its theoretical justification is that an active manager must match the volatility of her index, otherwise they are necessarily more risky. Said another way, it is a form of an insult that says you are not good selectors of securities, just buyers of risks.<\/p>\n<p>Fortunately, folks have pointed out the spurious nature of standard deviation and beta as risk measures and proposed alternatives like semi-standard deviation (thanks, Frank Sortino). But the \u201cvolatility = risk\u201d and \u201creturns only happen by taking on risk\u201d misunderstanding still steers the manager selection ship captained by many folks in investment management. Mostly it punishes active investment managers because in the Treynor ratio the risk measure of the market is given as 1.0, by definition. In other words, the \u201cmarket\u201d gets to keep all of its return. The Sharpe ratio makes a similar tilted assumption in its use of standard deviation, where investment managers with high amounts of outperformance are considered more risky. How exactly?<\/p>\n<p>In summary, if you are a rational investment manager and you understand that large outperformance hurts your Sharpe ratio, and that the measure of your Sharpe ratio may be the reason why you receive in excess of $1 billion in additional assets under management, and that these additional assets are the difference from just getting by and large profits for your firm, then you look for ways to \u201ctoe the line\u201d and reduce your volatility. But wait, what about end clients? Didn\u2019t they just lose out? Yes.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>I would love it if you would <a href=\"https:\/\/feedburner.google.com\/fb\/a\/mailverify?uri=JasonApolloVoss\"><strong>receive notification of my new articles \u2013 sign up here<\/strong><\/a> \ud83d\ude42 Don\u2019t forget to comment on the article in the space below. Thanks!<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>If you have followed my writing for any length of time you surely know that I hate the concept of volatility in investing. It is used as a proxy for risk and honestly that is a disaster for our industry, and for our end clients. Though I have covered this ground previously, I do not [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":8436,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[3,359],"tags":[280,304,151,187],"class_list":["post-8437","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-blog","category-most-misunderstood-investing-concepts","tag-beta","tag-risk","tag-standard-deviation","tag-volatility"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8437","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8437"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8437\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8436"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8437"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8437"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jasonapollovoss.com\/web\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8437"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}